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ABSTRACT 
 
Monetary cooperation in East Asia has become increasingly important and 
practical, particularly in times of regional economic and financial crisis. 
Contrary to those papers of studies in the mainstream, this paper evaluates the 
feasibility of monetary union in East Asia by benchmarking its optimum currency 
area (OCA) criteria against selected dollarised countries and the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Four criteria are proposed. The US 
dollar is designated as the anchor currency. To some extent, results do confirm 
the validity of the criteria and suggest a considerably strong case for monetary 
integration in parts of the region.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent development, East Asian leaders have agreed to create an $80 
billion fund to combat the global economic crisis (Esguerra 2008). The 
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initial agreement called for Korea, Japan, and China to provide 80 percent 
of the fund, or $64 billion, with ASEAN members providing the remaining 
$16 billion. This event clearly signifies a heightened awareness of the need 
for a region-wide monetary cooperative in East Asia. 
 Among scholars and policymakers, the idea of establishing an East 
Asian or Asian-Pacific currency area has attracted increasing attention 
(Swofford 2008; Kuroda 2004; Kwack 2004; Dutta 2000; Kwan 1998). The 
literature has generally favoured forming a currency area in East Asia on 
several grounds. The first is the continued progression towards openness 
and interdependence amongst the East Asian economies. The second is that 
these countries are vulnerable to economic disturbances from abroad, 
especially those caused by the high degree of mobility currently exhibited 
by international capital. Third, those disturbances appear to be symmetric 
among most of the East Asian countries. Lastly, the emergence of currency 
blocs elsewhere, in part intended to ward off speculative attacks, has 
reduced the options available for speculators to prey on.   
 Indeed, in May 2007, as an initial step of the Chiang Mai Initiative1, 
the ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus Japan, Korea, and China) countries agreed 
upon a network of bilateral swap agreements that would allow East Asian 
countries to borrow funds from one another. The creation of an Asian 
Currency Unit,2 has also been put forward.  Recently, the liberalisation of 
currency exchange, immigration, and trade between China and Taiwan (The 
China Post 2008) further supports the development of region-wide 
integration.  As illustrated by Shirono (2008), certain regional currency 
arrangements in East Asia would stimulate regional trade and generate 
economically significant welfare gains. As a result, it is not unreasonable to 
envisage a form of monetary integration in East Asia in the 21st century. 
Nonetheless, several observers have questioned the feasibility of an 
East Asian monetary union and the ability of member countries to adjust to 
external shocks in the absence of exchange rate flexibility as a policy 
instrument. The standard tool used in economic literature to evaluate the 
adequacy of a monetary integration is the OCA theory, first proposed by 
Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), with subsequent refinements by 
Kenen (1969) and Krugman (1990). The OCA theory compares the benefits 
                                                 
1 The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) is a collaboration among ASEAN+3 countries which strives 
for formation of Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSAs) among them. It is intended to mitigate 
short-term liquidity difficulties and to coordinate the work of international financial 
organizations like IMF and World Bank. 
 
2  The ACU as it is proposed is a currency basket and not a real currency, that is, a weighted 
index of East Asian currencies that will function as a benchmark for regional currency 
movements. 
66 
IJAPS, Vol. 5, No. 2 (July 2009) The Feasibility of an East Asian Monetary Union  
and costs of countries participating in a currency area. Benefits include 
lower transaction costs, price stabilisation, improved efficiency of resource 
allocation, and increased access to product, factor, and financial markets. 
The main cost, however, is the countries’ loss of sovereignty in maintaining 
national monetary and exchange rate policies. Many have argued that both 
costs and benefits depend on the nature of exogenous shocks affecting 
potential member countries and the speed with which they adjust to them. 
The costs tend to be lower (higher) if shocks are symmetric (asymmetric) 
and market mechanisms are quick (slow) to restore equilibrium after the 
shock. 
Much of the literature hinges on the aforementioned issue. For 
instance, Chow and Kim (2003) have investigated the symmetry of shocks, 
finding that East Asian countries are structurally different from each other 
and thus are likely to be subjected to asymmetric shocks. Huang and Guo 
(2006), based on their analysis of structural shocks, suggest that there are 
subgroups among the East Asian countries, of which one is more 
synchronised and may be the first to form a currency union. Based on other 
versions of shock extracting techniques, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999), 
Bayoumi and Mauro (2001) and Kawai and Motonishi (2005) were able to 
conclude that East Asia is nearly as good a candidate as the European Union 
for an internationally harmonised monetary policy. 
While shock symmetry is important, other criteria come into play as 
well. As a result, this paper attempts to differentiate itself from shock 
symmetry-related methods, including those related to correlations of 
macroeconomic variables. In this spirit, this paper intends to assess the 
feasibility of the East Asian countries’ instituting a regional monetary union 
based on criterion variables that are rarely considered in the East Asian 
OCA literature. The variables for different economic periods and their 
cross-period changes are computed for each country.3 With these variables, 
the characteristics of the East Asian countries are benchmarked against the 
dollarised and the EMU countries to evaluate the feasibility of monetary 
union. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents the relevant variables in the scope of OCA theory. Section 3 
describes the methodology adopted in this paper. Section 4 discusses the 
                                                 
3  The East Asian countries/territories included are Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Macau, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Though India is not located in East Asia, it is included here to 
reflect its rising dominance in Asia and the world. Abbreviations for the country/territory 
names are listed in Appendix. 
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results. Section 5 concludes and provides the relevant implications of the 
findings.  
 
 
OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA VARIABLES 
 
We explore the feasibility of monetary union in East Asia by examining 
whether the OCA characteristics of candidate countries are desirable enough 
to support a fixed exchange rate system. The choice of variables is based on 
their pertinence to East Asia. For the variables that are dependent on a 
reference country, the United States is nominated a priori as the reference 
country for several reasons. 
The US is chosen as the reference country, as soft pegs against the 
dollar are still strong and prevalent in East Asia despite the Asian financial 
crisis (McKinnon 2005).4 As asserted by McKinnon and Schnabl (2004), 
the dollar is widely used as the invoice currency for most East Asian trade, 
even though Japanese trade in the region is as prevalent as American trade. 
Furthermore, Mundell (2003) has explicitly called for the fixation of the 
yen-dollar rate as a step to achieve region-wide monetary stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region.5 If the yen-dollar rate is to be fixed, then setting the 
dollar as the reference currency for the region is completely rational. The 
following sections will argue why inflation convergence, export 
diversification, labour market flexibility and external indebtedness are 
critical factors that create efficiency and harmony in macroeconomic 
management.6 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4  Dollar pegs are entirely rational from the perspective of Asian countries; both facilitate 
hedging against exchange risks and help anchor domestic price levels. Though the East Asian 
countries have turned from being net debtors to net creditors against the US  after the crisis, 
they still opt to maintain the soft pegs, as any devaluation of the dollar will reduce the value of 
their dollar-denominated assets. Furthermore, the dollar is also the 'safe-haven' currency, into 
which nationals in emerging markets fly in the face of a domestic financial crisis. 
 
5  For this reason, Japan is included among the East Asian economies even though its developed 
status could feasibly support an independent exchange rate. It is widely agreed that the sharp 
yen-dollar rate fluctuations have caused havoc in the Asian crisis. Hence, the option of a 
currency basket peg is ruled out in this paper. It is proposed that the region strict peg its 
exchange rates against the dollar. 
 
6  See Appendix for data definition of the variables. 
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Inflation Convergence 
 
Inflation convergence has been repeatedly stressed by Robert Mundell as 
the most important convergence criterion (Mundell 2000). He asserts that if 
inflation rates are more or less similar, there should be no reason why 
exchange rate fixation would be difficult. As pointed out by Nyugen (2007), 
when inflation rates are steady over time, the terms of trade will be fairly 
stable, downplaying the need for a separate exchange rate. Also, since 
similar inflation rates result from similarities in monetary and fiscal stance 
as well as in economic structures, the cost of joining a currency area is 
presumably low when inflation rates are similar across countries. 
In empirical studies, in addition to principally real variables suggested 
by traditional OCA literature, Artis and Zhang (2001), Boreiko (2003), and 
Nguyen (2007) have implemented a measure of inflation convergence. In 
practice, convergence of inflation rates, both actual and political, is of 
course the central theme of the Maastricht Treaty and a prerequisite for 
accession into the EMU (Artis & Zhang 2001). In this paper, this criterion is 
measured by absolute inflation differential, USi xx  , where  and  are 
the rates of inflation in country x  and the US, respectively. Absolute value 
is used, since the magnitude is of concern here.
ix USx
i
7  Differentials Differentials 
are averaged over time; the lower the differential is, the higher the inflation 
convergence. 
 
Export Diversification 
 
Kenen (1969) contends that when a diversified economy's export sectors are 
subject to shocks, the law of large numbers will come into play, and total 
production will not suffer much if the shocks are independent and the 
economy produces a sufficiently large variety of different goods. Thus, it is 
relatively more viable to fix the currency value of a diversified economy 
than that of a specialised economy. This criterion has been included as an 
OCA criterion in, for instance, Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2005) and 
Nyugen (2007). In this paper, as in Nyugen (2007), the degree of export 
diversification is measured by the inverse of the period average of the 
annual Herfindahl indices, a popular indicator of the degree of 
specialisation. The Herfindahl index is computed as  ni isH 1 2
n
, where  
represents the share of the export of product i and is the number of 
is
                                                 
7  In Artis and Zhang (2001), absolute value is not used. In a correspondence with Artis in 2008, 
however, he indicated that absolute value may be a better option to avoid the problem of the 
cancellation of values of opposite sign. 
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products exported. Since export data of individual products are unavailable, 
annual export data according to the first-digit sub-industries of the United 
Nation's Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2 are 
used, as shown in Table 1. Given that there are 10 categories, the 
diversification indices would range from 1, in countries where exports are 
least diversified, to 10, where exports are most diversified. 
 
Table 1  
United Nation's Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 
Revision 2 
 
Code Product type 
0 Food and live animals. 
1 Beverages and tobacco. 
2 Crude minerals, inedible, except fuels. 
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials. 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. 
5 Chemicals and related products. 
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material. 
7 Machinery and transport equipment. 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles. 
9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere. 
Source: Nyugen (2007) 
 
Labour Market Flexibility 
 
Ingram (1962) and Kenen (1969) suggest that domestic labour market 
flexibility is equally important to Mundell's (1961) transnational labour 
mobility as an OCA criterion to maintain level of employment in the face of 
economic shocks. Thus, for any economy, the higher the flexibility of its 
labour market is, the greater its ability to recover from any unemployment 
shocks, and, thus, the higher its feasibility to enter a monetary union. A 
measure of labour market flexibility that has been used (Artis & Zhang 
2001) in the literature is a ranking measure of the severity of employment 
protection legislation (EPL). In the same vein, in this paper, an equivalent 
measure, a variable derived from the indexes by the Doing Business 
Project8 (Table 2) initiated by the World Bank, is used to measure labour 
market flexibility. The original indexes take values between 0 and 100, with 
higher values indicating more rigidity.9 To get the index for flexibility, the 
                                                 
8  Doing Business Project is a project to rank the easiness of doing business across countries in 
the world. The data source is provided in Appendix. 
 
9  The methodology used to construct these indexes can be found in Botero et al. (2003). 
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indexes are averaged and then deducted from 100. Thus, the higher the 
flexibility index is, the more flexible is the labour market. 
 
Table 2  
Indexes indicating labour market rigidity 
 Index Definition 
1 Difficulty of hiring Difficulty of hiring a new worker. 
2 Rigidity of hours Restrictions on expanding or contracting the number of working hours. 
3 Difficulty of firing  Difficulty and expense of dismissing a redundant worker. 
4 Nonwage labour cost Nonwage worker remuneration in percent of salary. 
5 Firing cost Cost of a redundant worker, expressed in weeks of wages. 
Source: Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer (2003) 
 
External Indebtedness 
 
Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2005), and Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) 
have used the liability to service external debt as an OCA criterion for 
African countries. According to them, the higher the external debt service is, 
the lower the incentive to devalue (i.e., to increase competitiveness) because 
the debt service is denominated in hard currencies, for instance, the dollar. 
The concept of external indebtedness can also be applied to East Asia.10 
Some evidence is found to substantiate this argument. Rogoff (2005) 
discovers that many developing countries in Asia still have high levels of 
debt dollarisation and indexation. When external indebtedness is high, it 
becomes important for developing countries to fix exchange rates so that 
debt denominated in hard currencies would not be subject to excessive 
foreign exchange risk. Therefore, in order to avoid international debt crisis, 
accession into a monetary bloc could be an option. In the same way, 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) posit that countries with higher external debt 
stocks are expected to be more willing to form a monetary union with a hard 
peg on a foreign device. Due to data availability, a popular measure of 
country indebtedness, that is, the ratio of total external debt to total exports 
of goods and services, is used to measure external indebtedness in this 
paper.11 
                                                 
10 As noted by Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), among the reasons for dependence on 
external debt are liberalisations undertaken by emerging markets since the late 1980s. These 
liberalisations have led to decline in tax revenues, particularly trade taxes, but increased 
expenditures due to the lifting of interest rate ceilings. 
 
11 As widely accepted in the literature (see, e.g., Calvo and Reinhart 2002), developed countries 
are generally not subjected to currency risks associated with external indebtedness. Thus, 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
The OCA variables are computed for 17 East Asian (EA)12, four four 
dollarised (DL), and three developed Pacific (DP) countries for different 
economic periods: the growth period (1981–1996), the crisis period (1997–
2000), the post-crisis period (2001–2007), and the long-run period (1981–
2007). For identification, these periods are referred to as EA periods when 
EA countries are concerned and as DL periods when DL countries are 
concerned. These periods clearly reflect the general economic conditions in 
EA countries and characterise the economic circumstances in the DL 
countries. This is so because the 1997 Asian crisis had not only impacted 
the EA region but also spilled over to Brazil and the whole Latin American 
continent (inclusive of the DL countries) in 1998–1999 (Beckerman and 
Solimano 2002).  
 The growth period, 1981–1996, is part of the period prior to the Asian 
financial crisis, when the region experienced high economic growth. This 
period was called the "East Asian Miracle" by the World Bank (Calomiris & 
Beim, 2000).13 This period also takes into account the structural change 
after the petroleum crises in 1979. The crisis period, 1997–2000, is intended 
to assess if results are significantly different in times of distress. The period 
thereafter, 2001–2007, is analysed separately, since many believe that the 
regional crisis has driven the EA region toward greater regional integration 
and bilateral cooperation (Plummer, 2007).  
 Other than the variable values corresponding to the respective 
periods, cross-period percent changes are also reported to capture their 
trends. Percent change is used so that magnitudes of change between 
countries can easily be compared. Percent changes are calculated for 
growth-to-crisis-period (G-C), crisis-to-post-crisis-period (C-P), and 
growth-to-post-crisis-period (G-P). While the G-C and C-P changes are 
meant to describe the trend from one economic period to another, the G-P 
change is, to an extent, intended to look at the trend minus the Asian crisis 
effect.   
 The DL countries included are Ecuador, which dollarised in 2000, El 
Salvador and Guatemala, which both dollarised in 2001, and Panama, which 
                                                                                                                                                
external indebtedness as an OCA criterion is not applied to developed countries (Japan, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and EMU countries) in this paper. 
 
12 Also stands for East Asia. 
 
13 Real GDP of eight EA countries in 1965–1993 grew at an average annual rate of nearly nine 
percent, more than twice as fast as their Latin American counterparts. 
 
72 
IJAPS, Vol. 5, No. 2 (July 2009) The Feasibility of an East Asian Monetary Union  
dollarised in 1904 (Castillo 2006).14 The DP countries are Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. As with the EA countries, the reference 
country designated for the DL and DP countries is the US. The purpose of 
including the DP countries is to introduce a control on the power of the 
methods adopted. Given our a priori economic knowledge, these countries 
should possess some characteristics that can help us to verify the validity of 
the measurements used. 
 In addition, the variables are also computed for the EMU countries 
for the pre-Maastricht period (1988–1993), the post-Maastricht period 
(1994–1998), and the post-euro period (1999–2007). These periods shall be 
called the EMU periods. The periods are structured according to several 
milestones: July 1, 1987, the effective date of the Single European Act; 
November 1, 1993, the effective date of the Maastricht Treaty; and January 
1, 1999, the day the euro was launched. As with other countries, cross-
period percent changes are also computed for the EMU countries.  
 The EMU countries included are those that adopted the euro in the 
initial stage: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Germany is not included, since it is 
considered the de facto anchor country—the reference for the EMU 
countries when it comes to the variables that require a reference. Thus, 10 
EMU countries are included.  
 To assess the feasibility of the EA countries, benchmarking against 
the DL and EMU countries is carried out. First, by benchmarking against 
the DL countries, the feasibility of hard dollar pegs among EA countries can 
be partially evaluated. Besides the DL countries, comparison to Hong Kong, 
which has adopted a formal currency board system (which fixes the HK 
dollar to the US dollar) since 1983, is also made whenever necessary. 
Second, by benchmarking against the EMU countries, the feasibility that a 
regional monetary union in the EA region will be as good a candidate as the 
EMU can be assessed.  
 The benchmarking is done in a simple manner.15 Every variable value 
of each EA country for each EA period is compared to the second least-
favourable value (the benchmark) of the DL countries for each DL period 
and of the EMU countries for each EMU period. Favourability is defined 
according to the OCA theory. For every EA-DL and EA-EMU 'paired 
comparison', if the majority of the EA values are as favourable as or more 
                                                 
14 In September 2000, Ecuador replaced its Sucre with the dollar. On January 1, 2001, El 
Salvador followed suit, and on May 1, Guatemala elevated the dollar to equal status with its 
quetzal. 
 
15 The next section provides an illustration of the procedure employed. 
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favourable than the benchmark, then the pair (paired comparison) is 
considered 'desirable'. Of all the EA-DL pairs, if most of them are desirable, 
then the case for fixed dollar pegs for EA countries is supported. 
Meanwhile, of all the EA-EMU pairs, a desirable majority would support 
the case for a region-wide monetary union. The two outcomes are 
independent and are not mutually exclusive.  
 A similar exercise is carried out for the cross-period percent change. 
An EA trend in accordance with the development of DL and EMU countries 
would bolster the case for a hard dollar peg and monetary union, 
respectively.   
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The analysis for the four OCA variables: (i) inflation convergence;                  
(ii) export diversification; (iii) labour market flexibility; and (iv) external 
indebtedness, are presented in this section.  
 
Inflation Convergence  
 
Table 3 reports the inflation differential (INF) and its cross-period percent 
change. The lower the EA INF is, the higher the inflation convergence with 
the US, and thus, the stronger the argument for exchange rate fixation with 
the dollar. In the EA region, the lowest EA INF is demonstrated by 
Malaysia (growth and long-run periods), Singapore (crisis period), and 
Thailand (post-crisis period). While Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia have shown high INFs, Myanmar is the only EA country that 
consistently exhibits very high INF throughout all periods. Thus, Myanmar 
is the least feasible country in EA for exchange rate fixation. 
 Even before benchmarking is done, several interesting findings can 
already be observed in Table 3. First, the universal trend toward inflation 
convergence with the US16 seems to bolster Mundell's (2005) proposal for a 
world currency, a system of many currencies tied by a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement. Second, the large reduction in DL INFs throughout the periods 
does fit the dollarisation policies undertaken by the DL countries. Third, the 
results do conform to our a priori economic knowledge. Canada, which is 
closely linked to the US, persistently demonstrates low INFs across all 
periods.  
                                                 
16 Since the anchor for the EMU countries is Germany, this interpretation does not apply to the 
EMU countries. 
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Table 3 
Inflation differential (INF) 
 Value (%) % Change 
 Crisis 
(C) 
Post-crisis 
(P) 
Long-run 
 
   Growth (G) 1981–1996 
1997–2000 2001–2007 1981–2007
G-C C-P G-P 
 East Asia (EA)       
1 CHN 9.268 2.532 1.986 5.502 –72.68 –21.56 –78.57
2 HKG 4.920 4.790 3.005 4.387 –2.64 –37.27 –38.92
3 KOR 2.697 2.663 0.975 2.230 –1.26 –63.39 –63.85
4 TWN 1.991 1.676 1.869 1.909 –15.82 11.52 –6.13
5 KHM 2.928 6.694 2.149 3.667 128.62 –67.90 –26.61
6 IDN 4.611 21.5761 6.663 7.644 367.921 –69.12 44.50
7 LAO 16.1201 67.2981 6.162 22.5961 317.481 –90.84 –61.77
8 MYS 1.443 1.709 0.987 1.360 18.43 –42.25 –31.60
9 MMR 14.4381 24.5861 23.6811 18.3381 70.29 –3.68 64.02
10 PHL 8.930 4.943 2.512 6.625 –44.65 –49.18 –71.87
11 SGP 1.941 1.652 1.881 1.883 –14.89 13.86 –3.09
12 THA 1.593 3.493 0.955 1.700 119.27 –72.66 –40.05
13 VNM 24.1091 3.890 4.166 11.0061 –83.86 7.10 –82.72
14 IND 5.315 5.310 2.046 4.437 –0.09 –61.47 –61.51
15 MAC 3.951 3.308 2.994 3.455 –16.27 –9.49 –24.22
16 BRN 5.303 1.771 2.511 3.886 –66.60 41.78 –52.65
17 JPN 2.404 2.143 2.968 2.517 –10.86 38.50 23.46
         
 Dollarised (DL)       
1 ECU 33.452 51.1111 7.982 29.2031 52.79 –84.38 –76.14
2 ELS 12.575 1.682 1.139 7.913 –86.62 –32.28 –90.94
3 GTM 12.002 4.415 4.454 8.866 –63.21 0.88 –62.89
4 PAN 2.5521 1.205 1.632 2.108 –52.78 35.44 –36.05
         
 Developed Pacific (DP)      
1 AUS 2.818 1.227 0.822 2.054 –56.46 –33.01 –70.83
2 NZL 4.400 1.222 0.492 2.894 –72.23 –59.74 –88.82
3 CAN 1.445 0.596 0.882 1.170 –58.75 47.99 –38.96
         
 Mean        
East Asia 4.894 3.327 2.739 3.657 0.47 –57.82 –39.71
Dollarised 19.343 2.434 3.802 6.296 –3.58 –73.96 –74.90
Developed Pacific 2.888 1.015 0.732 2.039 –64.85 –27.88 –74.65
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 3  (continued) 
 
 
 
Pre- 
Maastricht 
(R) 
1988–1993 
Post-
Maastricht 
(M) 
1994–1998 
Post- 
euro  
(E) 
1999–2007
 
Long-run
1981–2007
R-M M-E R-E 
 EMU        
1 AUT 0.789 0.435 0.482 0.738 –44.82 10.85 –38.84
2 BEL 1.138 0.387 0.676 1.226 –66.04 74.85 –40.62
3 FIN 2.844 0.911 0.778 2.107 –67.96 –14.59 –72.63
4 FRA 1.475 0.594 0.434 1.833 –59.70 –26.97 –70.57
5 IRL 1.482 0.704 2.208 3.017 –52.49 213.54 48.97
6 ITA 2.353 1.768 0.829 3.300 –24.86 –53.10 –64.75
7 LUX 0.901 0.347 0.860 1.220 –61.54 148.16 –4.56
8 NDL 1.191 0.458 1.018 0.850 –61.51 122.18 –14.47
9 PRT 7.000 1.862 1.389 6.618 –73.40 –25.42 –80.16
10 ESP 2.456 1.667 1.627 3.422 –32.15 –2.36 –33.75
Mean 2.163 0.913 1.030 2.433 –54.45 44.71 –37.14
Source: See Appendix for data definitions and sources. 
Note: 1 Excluded from mean calculation.  
 
 
Table 4 
EA-DL and EA-EMU paired comparisons for INF 
DL EMU 
EA Growth (G) 
Crisis 
(C) 
Post-
crisis 
(P) 
Long- 
run 
(LR) 
Pre-
Maastricht 
(R) 
Post-
Maastricht 
(M) 
Post-
euro 
(E) 
Long- 
run 
(LR) 
Growth (G) 14 8 8 12 6 2 2 7 
Crisis (C) 14 10 10 14 7 2 0 7 
Post-crisis (P) 16 14 14 16 10 3 3 13 
Long-run (LR) 15 10 11 14 6 2 1 6 
Source: Author's calculation 
 
As explained in the methodology section, benchmarking is done to assess 
the potentialities of the EA countries. The cells in Table 4 display the 
number of favourable EA INFs for each EA-DL and EA-EMU paired 
comparison. For example, the upper-left-most cell shows that 14 of the 17 
EA INFs of the EA growth period are less than the DL benchmark of the DL 
growth period. We can also find that almost all the EA-DL pairs, especially 
those concerning the EA post-crisis period, are highly desirable (more than 
half of the 17 EA INFs are more favourable than the benchmark). On the 
other hand, almost all the EA-EMU pairs are not desirable. Only the EA-
P/EMU-R pair is slightly desirable. All these findings may lend some 
support for fixed dollar pegs for most EA countries, but they may suggest 
that only about half of the EA countries (in the post-crisis period) have 
reached the stage of EMU (in the pre-Maastricht period). 
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Table 5 exhibits the paired comparison results for INF change. 
Amongst the EA-DL pairs, only those related to the DL C-P change are 
desirable. This may imply a general EA INF trend, which is in accordance 
with the DL INF movement from the crisis to the post-crisis period. Since 
three of the four DL countries only began to dollarise towards the end of the 
crisis period and in the beginning of the post-crisis period, this finding may 
indicate a fixed-dollar-peg prospect as good as or better than the DL 
benchmark for the EA countries. A comparable result can also be found for 
the EA-EMU pairs. All of the pairs pertaining to EMU M-E change are 
highly desirable. The cross-period shifts in EA seem to be in line with the 
integration process that took place in EMU from the post-Maastricht to the 
post-euro period. 
 
Table 5 
EA-DL and EA-EMU paired comparisons for INF change17 
 
DL change EMU change EA change G-C C-P G-P R-M M-E R-E 
G-C 3 11 3 4 15 8 
C-P 6 12 5 9 17 11 
G-P 6 14 4 9 17 13 
 Source: Author's calculation 
 
  In short, the EA inflation convergence levels and their shifts are 
consistent with the argument for a hard dollar peg. While their inflation 
convergence levels have up to now not seemed to buttress the case for 
monetary union, their trends, however, conform to those moving toward a 
union. 
 
Export Diversification 
 
Table 6 shows the export diversification index (EXP) and its cross-period 
percent change. To recap, the EXP extends from 1, in countries where 
exports are least diversified, to 10, where exports are most diversified. The 
higher the EXP, the stronger is the case for a fixed exchange rate. The 
highest EA EXP is shown by the Philippines (growth period), Indonesia 
(crisis and post-crisis periods), and India (long-run period). The lowest EA 
EXP is exhibited by Brunei (growth, crisis, and long-run periods), and 
Cambodia (post-crisis period).  
                                                 
17 Abbreviations are explained here: G-C for growth-to-crisis-period change, C-P for crisis-to-
post-crisis-period change, G-P for growth-to-post-crisis-period change, R-M for pre-
Maastricht-to-post-Maastricht-period change, M-E for post-Maastricht-to-post-euro-period 
change, and R-E for pre-Maastricht-to-post-euro-period change. 
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Table 6  
Export diversification index (EXP)  
 
  Value (index) % Change 
 
  
Growth (G) 
1981–1996 
Crisis (C) 
1997–2000
Post-crisis (P) 
2001–2005 
Long-run 
1981–2005 G-C C-P G-P 
 East Asia (EA)       
1 CHN 4.356 3.252 3.201 3.867 –25.34 –1.57 –26.52 
2 HKG 2.895 2.953 3.211 2.963 2.00 8.74 10.92 
3 KOR 3.539 2.833 2.508 3.154 –19.95 –11.47 –29.13 
4 TWN 3.501 2.630 3.087 3.242 –24.88 17.38 –11.83 
5 KHM 1.782 1.546 1.141 1.592 –13.24 –26.20 –35.97 
6 IDN 2.904 6.390 6.159 3.599 120.041 –3.62 112.091
7 LAO 1.927 2.674 2.442 2.041 38.76 –8.68 26.73 
8 MYS 4.358 2.475 3.073 3.616 –43.21 24.16 –29.49 
9 MMR 2.529 3.412 4.119 2.834 34.91 20.72 62.87 
10 PHL 4.854 1.928 2.382 3.347 –60.28 23.55 –50.93 
11 SGP 3.148 2.187 2.615 2.833 –30.53 19.57 –16.93 
12 THA 3.829 3.922 4.270 3.925 2.43 8.87 11.52 
13 VNM 3.346 3.859 5.105 3.591 15.33 32.29 52.57 
14 IND 4.542 4.294 4.910 4.568 –5.46 14.35 8.10 
15 MAC 1.678 1.381 1.171 1.515 –17.70 –15.21 –30.21 
16 BRN 1.099 1.229 1.197 1.164 11.83 –2.60 8.92 
17 JPN 2.001 1.964 2.149 2.023 –1.85 9.42 7.40 
 Dollarised (DL)       
1 ECU 2.158 2.406 2.659 2.281 11.49 10.52 23.22 
2 ELS 2.028 1.898 4.830 2.217 –6.41 154.481 138.171
3 GTM 2.113 2.655 3.972 2.418 25.65 49.60 87.98 
4 PAN 3.606 3.975 1.609 2.924 10.23 –59.52 –55.38 
 Developed Pacific (DP)       
1 AUS 5.136 6.173 6.612 5.532 20.19 7.11 28.74 
2 NZL 3.327 3.717 3.834 3.478 11.72 3.15 15.24 
3 CAN 5.038 4.456 5.025 4.932 –11.55 12.77 –0.26 
 Mean        
East Asia 3.076 2.878 3.102 2.934 –8.57 6.45 –2.62 
Dollarised 2.476 2.734 3.268 2.460 10.24 0.20 18.61 
Developed 
Pacific 
4.500 4.782 5.157 4.647 6.79 7.68 14.57
  
Pre- 
Maastricht  
(R) 
1988–1993 
Post-
Maastricht 
(M) 
1994–1998 
Post- 
euro 
(E) 
1999–2005
Long-run 
1981–2005 R-M M-E R-E 
 EMU        
1 AUT 3.956 3.293 3.927 3.859 –16.76 19.26 –0.73
2 FIN 3.591 3.603 3.353 3.646 0.34 –6.94 –6.62
3 FRA 4.547 4.164 3.928 4.366 –8.44 –5.65 –13.62
4 IRL 5.319 3.563 3.262 4.193 –33.01 –8.45 –38.67
5 ITA 4.146 4.096 4.244 4.265 –1.21 3.59 2.34
6 NLD 6.946 6.381 5.522 6.249 –8.12 –13.47 –20.50
7 PRT 4.563 4.515 4.453 4.742 –1.06 –1.38 –2.42
8 ESP 4.557 4.180 4.276 4.569 –8.28 2.30 –6.18
9 BEL-LUX2 4.681 5.021 4.968 4.909 7.25 –1.06 6.11
Mean 4.701 4.313 4.215 4.533 –7.70 –1.31 –8.92
Source: See Appendix for data definitions and sources. 
Notes: 1 Excluded from mean calculation.  
 2 Data for Belgium and Luxembourg are lumped together by the source.  
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 A few important observations are worth mentioning. First, the EXP 
values seem to be valid in measuring the level of diversification; the EXP 
values are in agreement with the common knowledge that larger or more 
industrialised economies (in this case, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) 
would have more resources and thus more diversified exports. Second, the 
high DL EXP increases from the growth to the post-crisis period appear to 
be consistent with the fixed exchange rate policies undertaken by the DL 
countries. Third, the pattern of the EA EXPs appears to suggest that the 
Asian turmoil has a negative relationship with the region's diversification 
levels.  
To evaluate the prospect of a fixed dollar peg and monetary 
integration, as before, comparison to DL and EMU benchmarks is done. The 
results in Table 7 indicate that all of the EA-DL paired comparisons are 
desirable. In each pair, at least half of the 17 EA EXPs are more favourable 
than the DL benchmark. Nevertheless, the pairs concerning the DL post-
crisis period show smaller majorities, which means that fewer EA EXPs 
have reached the post-crisis period DL benchmark level. On the other hand, 
all of the EA-EMU pairs are not desirable. This may indicate that the case 
for hard dollar pegs in EA is somewhat supported but that the case for 
monetary union is not.18 
 
Table 7  
EA-DL and EA-EMU paired comparisons for EXP 
DL EMU 
EA Growth (G) 
Crisis 
(C) 
Post-
crisis 
(P) 
Long- 
run 
(LR) 
Pre-
Maastricht 
(R) 
Post-
Maastricht 
(M) 
Post-
euro 
(E) 
Long- 
run 
(LR) 
Growth (G) 12 12 11 12 4 5 7 4 
Crisis (C) 12 11 9 11 2 4 5 4 
Post-crisis (P) 14 12 9 13 5 5 5 5 
Long-run (LR) 12 12 12 12 1 6 6 3 
Source: Author's calculation 
 
 Table 8 displays the results of paired comparisons for EXP change. 
The results show that all of the EA-DL pairs are not desirable whereas all of 
the EA-EMU ones are desirable. Particularly, the EA-EMU pairs related to 
the EA C-P change are highly desirable. This may imply that the nature of 
the EA EXP shift, especially from the crisis to the post-crisis period, is 
particularly parallel to the developments in EMU. The patterns found here 
                                                 
18 Nonetheless, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the stage of economic development does 
play a role in EXP. Industrialised countries should have higher EXPs regardless of whether 
they are part of a monetary union. But then again, one cannot refute that industrialised 
countries may be more ready to form a monetary union than would be industrialising countries. 
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may strengthen the prospect for monetary integration but not for hard dollar 
pegs.  
 
Table 8 
EA-DL and EA-EMU paired comparisons for EXP change 
DL change EMU change EA change G-C C-P G-P R-M M-E R-E 
G-C 5 5 3 10 9 12 
C-P 7 7 3 16 13 16 
G-P 6 6 4 10 9 11 
Source: Author's calculation 
  
In conclusion, when the level of export diversification is 
contemplated, the EA countries are more ready to fix exchange rates to the 
dollar individually than they are to collectively establish a regional 
monetary union. Nonetheless, the pattern of the diversification level shifts 
seems to demonstrate some evidence of the EA's being on the road to 
implementing monetary union but not fixed dollar pegs. 
 
Labour Market Flexibility 
 
Table 9 exhibits the labour market flexibility index (LAB) for post-crisis 
period (2004–2008).19 The index extends from 0 in countries where labour 
markets are the least flexible to 100 where labour markets are the most 
flexible. The higher the LAB is, the more flexible the labour market, and 
thus, the stronger the case for fixed exchange rate.  
The means show that the general EA labour market is more flexible 
than the DL and EMU ones but is less flexible than the DP one. Among the 
EA countries, Singapore, Brunei, Hong Kong, and Japan have the highest 
LABs, whilst Taiwan has the lowest LAB. Amongst the EA countries, all of 
the EA LABs are higher than the DL benchmark, and only the Taiwanese 
LAB is lower than the EMU benchmark.20 
 In another respect, the relatively high LAB enjoyed by Hong Kong 
seems to be consistent with the currency board policy employed by the state. 
The high LABs displayed by Brunei and Singapore are also consistent with 
the monetary union between the two countries since 1967. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Labour market flexibility data are available only from 2004 to 2008. 
 
20 Since LAB data are not available for the period before 2004, unlike those of the other 
variables, the data range here for the EMU is thus similar to the EA one. 
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Table 9  
Labour market flexibility index (LAB) 
East Asia (EA) Index  Dollarised (DL) Index  EMU Index 
1 CHN 62.12  1 ECU 37.07  1 AUT 71.10 
2 HKG 88.34  2 ELS 65.56  2 BEL 73.98 
3 KOR 55.61  3 GTM 60.36  3 FIN 59.43 
4 TWN 44.97  4 PAN 40.32  4 FRA 49.40 
5 KHM 58.41   Mean 50.83  5 IRL 82.78 
6 IDN 48.38      6 ITA 68.76 
7 LAO 69.44     7 LUX 49.83 
8 MYS 77.77   Developed    8 NDL 64.72 
9 MMR n.a.1   Pacific (DP) Index  9 PRT 45.24 
10 PHL 57.54  1 AUS 88.75  10 ESP 46.30 
11 SGP 97.98  2 NZL 94.86   Mean 61.15 
12 THA 76.90  3 CAN 90.89     
13 VNM 58.39   Mean 91.50     
14 IND 64.86         
15 MAC n.a.         
16 BRN 94.00         
17 JPN 85.45         
 Mean 69.35         
Source: See Appendix for data definitions and sources   
Note: 1 Not available.  
  
 In brief, it can be deduced that the levels of labour market flexibility 
in EA are as high as or even higher than the levels feasible for the hard 
dollar peg and monetary union. 
 
External Indebtedness 
 
Table 10 reports the external indebtedness ratio (DEB) for each economic 
period and its cross-period percent change. The higher the DEBs are, the 
higher the currency risks, and the higher the incentives to fix exchange 
rates. The table reveals that the most indebted EA country is Laos for all 
periods, whilst the least indebted country is Singapore (growth period), and 
Taiwan (crisis, post-crisis, and long-run periods). Understandably, the least 
developed countries in the EA region (Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar) are 
highly indebted for some of the periods.     
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Table 10  
External indebtedness ratio (DEB) 
   Value  (ratio) % Change 
  Growth (G) 1981-1996 
Crisis 
(C) 
1997-2000
Post-crisis
(P) 
2001-2006
Long- 
run 
1981-2006
G-C C-P G-P 
 East Asian (EA)       
1 CHN 0.771 0.653 0.429 0.670 –15.30 –34.30 –44.36
2 HKG 0.169 0.996 0.387 0.353 489.35 –61.14 128.99
3 KOR 0.854 0.780 0.660 0.818 –8.67 –15.38 –22.72
4 TWN 0.249 0.235 0.337 0.269 –5.62 43.40 35.34
5 KHM 6.749 2.014 1.055 4.220 –70.16 –47.62 –84.37
6 IDN 2.220 2.416 1.722 2.087 8.83 –28.73 –22.43
7 LAO 10.621 5.252 4.457 8.613 –50.55 –15.14 –58.04
8 MYS 0.758 0.456 0.377 0.621 –39.84 –17.32 –50.26
9 MMR 9.475 3.261 2.009 6.539 –65.58 –38.39 –78.80
10 PHL 2.804 1.421 1.471 2.282 –49.32 3.52 –47.54
11 SGP 0.088 1.161 1.188 0.506 1219.32 2.33 1250.00
12 THA 1.335 1.359 0.563 1.158 1.80 –58.57 –57.83
13 VNM 4.925 1.516 0.600 3.215 –69.22 –60.42 –87.82
14 IND 3.156 1.951 1.170 2.469 –38.18 –40.03 –62.93
15 MAC n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1
16 BRN n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1
17 JPN n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1
 Dollarised (DL)       
1 ECU 3.287 2.760 2.019 2.913 –16.03 –26.85 –38.58
2 ELS 1.853 1.134 1.741 1.716 –38.80 53.53 –6.04
3 GTM 1.666 1.075 1.082 1.440 –35.47 0.65 –35.05
4 PAN 1.235 0.838 1.006 1.121 –32.15 20.05 –18.54
Mean East Asia 3.155 1.677 1.173 2.416 –46.85 –30.05 –62.82
 Dollarised 2.010 1.452 1.462 1.798 –27.76 0.69 –27.26
 Source: See Appendix for data definitions and sources  
 Note: 1 Not available. For Japan, not applicable.  
 
 
Table 11 displays the favourable EA DEBs and DEB changes for 
each EA–DL paired comparison. Moving from the EA growth to the EA 
post–crisis period (from the top to the bottom row), we can see that the 
numbers through the columns decline gradually (at most increase by one in 
the crisis period), until each number is less than half of 14, the total number 
of EA DEBs. For the DEB change, those pairs related to the DL C–P change 
are especially undesirable, meaning that almost all of the EA DEBs have not 
increased more than the DL benchmark has when the DL C–P change is 
concerned. 
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Table 11 
EA–DL paired comparisons for DEB and DEB change 
 
DL DL change 
EA Growth 
(G) 
Crisis 
(C) 
Post-
crisis (P) 
Long-run 
(LR) 
EA 
change G-C C-P G-P 
Growth (G) 8 8 8 7     
Crisis (C) 5 9 9 6 G-C 7 4 7 
Post-crisis (P) 3 6 6 4 C-P 8 3 8 
Long-run (LR) 7 8 8 7 G-P 5 3 5 
Source: Author's calculation. 
  
 It is apparent that the EA DEBs, on the whole, have been falling to 
levels lower than the DL benchmark level. It may be concluded that the EA 
countries do not display debt–induced exchange–rate–fixing incentives as 
high as those displayed by the DL countries.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Upon examining the four OCA variables, some conclusions are worth 
highlighting. The results of INF, EXP, and LAB appear to support the OCA 
theory; the actual arrangements do conform to those proposed by the theory. 
The EA region, when benchmarked against the DL countries, exhibits 
inflation rates and export diversification levels that fulfil the "requirement" 
for exchange rate fixation. Also, these variables are found to be moving on 
the path toward monetary union when compared against the EMU countries. 
In addition, the region's labour markets have reached a flexibility level          
that can most probably support a region–wide monetary integration. 
Nevertheless, the EA countries may not be hastened to move into a dollar 
bloc, since their external debt levels have fallen tremendously vis–à–vis 
their DL counterparts. Out of the four criteria, three of them seem to provide 
some evidence for an EA dollar bloc. Specifically, if Mundell's argument is 
right, the low INFs of EA countries during the post–crisis era should be the 
best foundation for exchange rate fixation. 
 How do these conclusions compare with those made by others using 
different methods (and criteria)? Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) show 
that EA countries have adjusted more rapidly to demand and supply shocks 
than have the EMU countries. Accordingly, they conclude that the EA 
region came as close as the EMU to being an OCA. In a later update with a 
comparable method by Kawai and Motonishi (2005), similar conclusions 
have been reached. They even demonstrate that real activity variables, such 
as growth rates of real GDP, real personal consumption, and real fixed 
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investment, were highly correlated among major EA economies. In a more 
recent study, Sato and Zhang (2006) find that some clusters in the EA 
region share both long–run and short–run synchronous movements of real 
outputs, which are favourable insofar as OCA is concerned. In particular, 
short–run common business cycles are found in parts of ASEAN. These 
studies confirm to an extent the evidence for an EA dollar bloc found in this 
paper.  
 Hitherto, interpretations are made for the whole region. Nonetheless, 
it may be valuable to look at the results at the individual country level. Since 
the post-crisis period is the most current period, the results for this period 
are detailed. Table 12 summarises the results for the EA countries by the 
four OCA variables. The results are for the comparison of the post-crisis 
period EA value with the DL and EMU values for their corresponding 
periods. For each country, if a variable value is more favourable than the 
corresponding benchmark, a score of 1 is assigned; otherwise, a score of 0 is 
given. The higher the total score is, the higher the feasibility of establishing 
a dollar currency area. The ratios of each country's total obtained score to its 
total obtainable score are also provided. 
 In Table 12, the total scores show that some countries are more 
suitable than others for forming a dollar area. Among them, India, Thailand, 
and Malaysia can be said to be 'highly eligible' (% score70); China, Korea, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam may be 'moderately 
eligible' (50% score<70); Hong Kong, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Brunei, and Japan can be considered 'slightly eligible' (30% 
score<50); and Macau is 'the least eligible' (% score<30).  
These groupings do not seem to be similar to those found in existing 
studies. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) discover a northern bloc 
comprising Japan, Korea, and Taiwan and a south-eastern bloc comprising 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Meanwhile, 
Kawai and Motonishi (2005) found highly correlated economies among 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The groups 
found here also do not show any resemblance to a group suggested by 
Huang and Guo (2006). Nevertheless, the groupings discovered here are 
somewhat in accordance with those found by Sato and Zhang (2006). They 
find groupings of Singapore-Thailand-Indonesia, Hong Kong-Korea-China, 
and Japan-Taiwan. 
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Table 12 
Paired comparison results for post-crisis period EA 
INF EXP LAB DEB 
DL EMU DL EMU DL  
G C P R M E G C P R M E DL EMU G C P 
Total % score 
CHN 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 10 58 
HKG 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 8 47 
KOR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 10 58 
TWN 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 8 47 
KHM 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 6 35 
IDN 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 65 
LAO 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 8 47 
MYS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 12 71 
MMR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 n.a.1 n.a. 1 1 1 7 47 
PHL 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 10 58 
SGP 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 10 58 
THA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 13 76 
VNM 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 10 58 
IND 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 14 82 
MAC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 25 
BRN 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 43 
JPN 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 43 
Source: Author's calculation. 
Note: 1 Not available. For Japan, not applicable. 
  
 In short, the results suggest that when the rarely studied OCA 
variables are considered, different country groupings from those in the 
literature can be found. Therefore, consideration of a comprehensive set of 
variables from different facets of the OCA theory is crucial in identifying 
homogenous groups. Thus, the 'highly eligible' group identified here may 
take the lead in fostering integration. Obviously, active commitments to the 
Asian Currency Unit initiative by the Asian Development Bank would be a 
good start. Nonetheless, asymmetries in resource dependencies, growth 
experience, maturity of financial markets, and/or economic policies (Chow 
& Kim 2003) could be possible obstacles to integration.   
 Nevertheless, identifying groups of countries that have achieved a 
high degree of macroeconomic convergence is only the first step and may 
raise more questions than answers. The existence of differences or 
heterogeneities across countries does not necessarily imply that benefits 
cannot be achieved through monetary integration. This follows from the 
endogeneity argument of the OCA criteria—originally flagged by Frankel 
and Rose (1998)—which suggests that countries become similar when they 
share a common currency. Viewed in this light, the conclusions of this paper 
are a valuable contribution to the scholarly and policy debate over whether 
creation of a monetary union should precede or follow other forms of 
integration. The results could also be a valuable resource for the Asian 
85 
IJAPS, Vol. 5, No. 2 (July 2009)  Chee-Heong Quah 
Development Bank for considering the technical issues (e.g., the choice of 
anchor currency) of an Asian currency.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Table A 
Data definitions and sources 
Country Code CPI1 
Export 
structure2
Employing 
workers index3 
EDT, 
XGS4 
Brunei BRN 83:1–08:3 88–065 08 – 
Cambodia KHM 94:1–07:12 81–04 04–08 86:06 
China CHN 87:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 82:06 
Hong Kong HKG 81:1–08:3 81–05 04–08 82:07 
India IND 81:1–08:3 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Indonesia IDN 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Japan JPN 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 n.a.6 
Korea KOR 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Laos LAO 87:12–01:12,  03:5–08:3 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Macau MAC 88:1–08:3 81–04 – – 
Malaysia MYS 81:1–08:3 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Myanmar MMR 81:1–07:12 81–04 – 81:06 
Philippines PHL 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Singapore SGP 81:1–08:3 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Taiwan7 TWN 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 84:06 
Thailand THA 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Vietnam VNM 90:1–08:4 81–03 04–08 81:06 
Ecuador ECU 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 81:06 
El Salvador ELS 81:1–08:4 81–04 04–08 81:06 
Guatemala GTM 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Panama PAN 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 81:06 
Australia AUS 81Q1–08Q1 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
New Zealand NZL 81Q1–08Q1 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
Canada CAN 81:1–08:4 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
United States USA 81:1–08:4 81–05 n.a. n.a. 
Austria AUT 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
Belgium BEL 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
Finland FIN 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
France FRA 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
Ireland IRL 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
Italy ITA 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A (continued) 
Country Code CPI1 Export structure2
Employing 
workers index3 
EDT, 
XGS4 
Luxembourg LUX 81:1–08:9 81–05 08 n.a. 
Netherlands NLD 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
Portugal PRT 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
Spain ESP 81:1–08:9 81–05 04–08 n.a. 
Germany DEU 81:1–08:9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Notes: 
1. Consumer price indexes are from the IMF IFS database. For China, Vietnam, and Brunei, CPIs are 
sourced from ILO LABORSTA database whenever not available from IMF IFS. Cross–validation shows 
that both sources provide identical data. For Brunei, CPI data after 2005 are sourced from Department of 
Economic Planning and Development (DEPD) website, retrieved July 17, 2008 from 
http://www.depd.gov.bn/archive.html. Data should be consistent, since data from IFS are also sourced 
from DEPD.  
2. Export structure data for 1981–2000 are extracted from the NBER World Trade Flows database, whilst 
those for 2001–2005 are taken from International Trade Statistics at the International Trade Center 
UNCTAD/WTO website, retrieved April 08, 2008, from http://www.intracen.org/tradstat/sitc3–
3d/indexre.htm  
3. Data are sourced from the World Bank Group: Doing Business website. Retrieved July 08, 2008, from 
http://message.worldbank.org/external/external_error.htm 
4. EDT represents total external debt, sourced from ADB website, retrieved April 08, 2008, from 
http://www.adb.org/Statistics/ki.asp; XGS for exports of goods and services. For Hong Kong, 1999–2007 
data are external-debt-to-export ratios reported directly from EIU ViewsWire, various issues, downloaded 
from the Proquest database. 
5. Brunei data from ADB. 
6. Not applicable.  
7. Taiwan data are sourced from the Bureau of Foreign Trade, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics (DGBAS) and central bank databases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
